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Abstract 
 Responsible lending has become a very pertinent issue on the 
agenda of credit regulators across the globe who seek to combat 
the causes of consumer over-indebtedness. In this context the use 
of "pre-agreement assessment" as a tool to filter out those 
instances where, based on a consumer's creditworthiness or ability 
to repay, credit should not be granted to such a consumer, is a 
feature common to the lending regimes of various jurisdictions. This 
contribution consists of two parts: Part 1 provides a critical 
discussion of the reckless credit provisions of the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005. Part 2 details the responsible lending measures 
contained in the EU Consumer Credit Directive and the EU 
Mortgage Credit Directive and provides an appraisal of the 
responsible lending measures introduced by Belgium, being a 
jurisdiction that has always been very pro-active in the context of 
consumer credit protection. 
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1 Introduction 
Credit is part of the lives of millions of consumers across the globe. As much 
as it enables them to acquire goods it is unfortunately also the cause of 
many of their woes, because many consumers end up being over-indebted 
and unable to repay the credit on the agreed terms and conditions. 
Accordingly the global growth in credit consumerism has also given rise to 
the need to protect these credit consumers – not only against unscrupulous 
lenders but often also against themselves. This need for consumer 
protection in the credit sphere has sparked the development of responsible 
lending rules as a measure to prevent credit from being extended to 
consumers who are unable to afford it.1 Inherent in the notion of responsible 
lending is also the concept of responsible borrowing, which is encouraged 
by preventing consumers, through certain legislative measures, from over-
extending themselves financially.2 Responsible lending practices cover a 
wide array of measures such as consumer education and the promotion of 
financial literacy, responsible marketing, the provision of information, 
explanation and advice to consumers before the conclusion of the contract, 
the regulation of the cost of credit, the prohibition of certain lending practices 
and the pre-agreement screening of consumers to determine their ability to 
repay the debt as per the terms and conditions of the agreement (that is, 
creditworthiness or affordability). In the context of responsible lending (and 
borrowing) the use of "pre-agreement assessment" as a tool to filter out 
those instances where, based on a consumer's creditworthiness or ability to 
repay, credit should not be granted, is a feature common to the lending 
regimes of various jurisdictions.3 
The purpose of this contribution is to provide an overview of the nature and 
extent of pre-agreement assessment as a responsible lending tool in South 
Africa and the EU, and specifically Belgium as an EU member state with a 
progressive approach to the protection of credit consumers. Pertinent 
aspects regarding the pre-agreement assessment approaches in these 
jurisdictions will be discussed and compared and certain salient 
observations will be made that could possibly spark further debate as to 
appropriate features of a pre-agreement assessment model that could 
                                            
* Corlia M van Heerden. B Proc (UP) LLB (UP) LLM (Unisa) LLM (UP) LLD (RAU). 
Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria. Email: 
corlia.vanheerden@up.ac.za.  
  Reinhard Steennot. LLM (Ghent) LLD (Ghent). Professor, Department of 
Interdisciplinary Study of Law, Private Law and Business Law, Ghent University. 
Email: Reinhard.Steennot@UGent.be.  
1 World Bank 2013 http://www.Siteresources.worldbank.org/…/Resources/…/ 
Responsible-Lending-Paper.pdf 
2 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 67. 
3 For examples, see Wilson International Responses to Issues of Credit. 
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efficiently prevent or curb irresponsible lending and its ill-consequence, 
consumer over-indebtedness.  
This contribution will consist of two parts: Part One will contain a discussion 
of the provisions in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 pertaining to pre-
agreement assessment and reckless credit. Part Two will address the legal 
framework for pre-agreement assessment and responsible lending in the 
EU and Belgium and will conclude with a comparative discussion of the 
measures pertaining to pre-agreement assessment in South Africa, the EU 
and Belgium. 
2 Responsible lending and pre-agreement assessment in 
South Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
The substantive and procedural landscape of credit regulation in South 
Africa underwent a massive change with the enactment of the National 
Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) that came into full effective operation on 1 June 
2007. This Act replaced the outdated legislation that previously provided the 
framework for credit regulation, namely, the Credit Agreements Act,4 that 
regulated credit instalment sale and lease agreements in respect of 
movables, and the Usury Act,5 that regulated the same agreements and 
money lending transactions. The NCA is a comprehensive and compact 
piece of legislation that regulates a much wider scope of credit agreements 
than its predecessors and places no monetary cap on the amounts of the 
transactions regulated.6 South Africa does not have separate legislative 
frameworks for the regulation of consumer credit and mortgage credit (as is 
the case in the EU and Belgium) and accordingly only one set of rules as 
contained in the NCA applies across the board to all types of credit 
agreements, including mortgage credit. However, in certain instances the 
Act does provide for deviations or exceptions based on the type of 
agreement, or contains provisions that apply only to certain types of credit 
agreements. 
                                            
4 Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. 
5 Usury Act 73 of 1968. 
6 As discussed in para 3.2 below. The National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the NCA), 
however, does not apply to large credit agreements entered into by juristic person 
consumers. A juristic person is defined in s 1 of the NCA include a partnership, 
association or other body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, or a trust if it has 
three or more individual trustees or the trust is itself a juristic person. A stokvel, which 
term refers to an informal savings scheme among a number of natural persons, is, 
however, expressly excluded from this definition. 
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2.2 Scope of application 
As regards its application ratione personae the NCA applies to 
"consumers"7 who may either be natural persons or small juristic persons 
regardless of whether they enter into credit agreements for private or 
business purposes.8 However, it is to be noted that the purpose of the Act 
is not to protect "big business",9 and accordingly the application of the Act 
in so far as it relates to juristic person consumers is limited, as discussed in 
more detail below. It is to be noted further that the Act provides a sui generis 
definition of "juristic" persons that includes entities such as partnerships and 
trusts in certain instances, despite the fact that generally those entities are 
not otherwise regarded as juristic persons. 
The NCA refers to the party who extends credit as the "credit provider"10 
and mandates the registration of credit providers with the National Credit 
Regulator, being the entity responsible for the enforcement of the Act.11  
The "layered" application of the NCA ratione materiae is set out in section 4 
read with sections 5 to 9. The NCA applies to every credit agreement 
between parties dealing at arm's length and made within or having an effect 
within the Republic of South Africa.12 "Credit", when used as a noun, is 
                                            
7 As per s 1 of the NCA a "consumer", in respect of a credit agreement to which the 
NCA applies, means the party to whom goods or services are sold under a discount 
transaction, incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement; the party to whom 
money is paid, or credit granted, under a pawn transaction; the party to whom credit 
is granted under a credit facility; the mortgagor under a mortgage agreement; the 
borrower under a secured loan; the lessee under a lease; the guarantor under a 
credit guarantee; or the party to whom or at whose direction money is advanced or 
credit granted under any other credit agreement (governed by the NCA). 
8 Clearly, juristic persons cannot be said to enter into credit agreements for "private 
purposes". 
9 See Standard Bank v Hunkydory Investments 188 (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 634 (WCC). 
10 As per s 1 of the NCA "credit provider" in respect of any credit agreement to which 
the NCA applies means the party who supplies goods or services under a discount 
transaction, incidental credit agreement or instalment agreement; the party who 
advances money or credit under a pawn transaction; the party who extends credit 
under a credit facility; the mortgagee under a mortgage agreement; the lender under 
a secured loan; the lessor under a lease; the party to whom an assurance or promise 
is made under a credit guarantee; the party who advances money or credit to another 
under any other credit agreement; or any other person who acquires the rights of a 
credit provider under a credit agreement after it has been entered into. 
11 Section 40 of the NCA requires all credit providers to register, except persons who 
only provide "incidental credit". The National Credit Regulator (NCR), established in 
terms of s 12 of the NCA, registers credit providers. See further s 13 regarding the 
NCR's duties with regard to the development of an accessible credit market and s 
15 regarding its enforcement functions as well as s 16, which sets out its duties with 
regard to research and public information. 
12 Section 4(1) of the NCA. This application is subject to s 5 (which provides for the 
application of the NCA to incidental credit agreements) and s 6 (which provides for 
the limited application of the NCA to certain juristic persons). See further Otto and 
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defined in the Act as a deferral of payment of money owed to a person or a 
promise to defer such payment; or a promise to advance or pay money to 
or at the direction of another person.13 "Agreement" includes an 
arrangement or understanding between or among two or more parties, 
which purports to establish a relationship in law between those parties.14 
Thus it is essential to establish whether a specific agreement entered into 
in South Africa or having an effect in South Africa constitutes a "credit 
agreement" as provided for in the NCA. It should also be borne in mind that 
even if an agreement constitutes a credit agreement as defined in the NCA, 
the Act will not apply if the agreement was not concluded at arm's length.15 
Three main types of credit agreements are regulated by the NCA, namely, 
credit facilities,16 credit transactions17 and credit guarantees.18 It is 
                                            
Otto National Credit Explained ch 3; Stoop 2008 De Jure 352. (All references to 
sections hereinafter are to sections of the NCA, unless otherwise indicated.) 
13 Section 1. 
14 Section 1. 
15 On the topic of arm's length s 4(2)(b) of the NCA specifically provides that in any of 
the following arrangements the parties are not dealing at arm's length: A shareholder 
loan or other credit agreement between a juristic person, as a consumer, and a 
person who has a controlling interest in that juristic person, as a credit provider; a 
loan to a shareholder or other credit agreement between a juristic person, as a credit 
provider, and a person who has a controlling interest in that juristic person, as a 
consumer; a credit agreement between natural persons who are in a familial 
relationship and are co-dependent on one another or where one is dependent upon 
the other; and any other arrangement in which a party is not independent of the other 
and consequently does not necessarily strive to obtain the utmost possible 
advantage out of the transaction; or that is of a type that has been held in law to be 
between parties who are not dealing at arm's length. See further Beets v Swanepoel 
(NCHC) (unreported) case number 2150/09 of 5 October 2010; Friend v Sendal 2015 
1 SA 395 (GP). 
16 In terms of s 8(3) an agreement, irrespective of its form, but not including an 
agreement contemplated in s 8(2) or s 8(4)(6)(b), constitutes a "credit facility" if in 
terms of that agreement: (a) a credit provider undertakes to supply goods or services 
or to pay an amount or amounts, as determined by the consumer from time to time, 
to the consumer or on behalf of, or at the direction of, the consumer, and either to 
defer the consumer's obligation to pay any part of the cost of goods or services, or 
to repay to the credit provider any part of an amount or bill the consumer periodically 
for any part of the cost of goods or services, or any part of an amount; and (b) any 
charge fee or interest is payable to the credit provider in respect of any amount 
deferred or any amount billed and not paid within the time provided for in the 
agreement. 
17 As per s 8(4) an agreement, irrespective of its form, but not including an agreement 
contemplated in s 8(2) as indicated below, constitutes a "credit transaction" if it is a 
pawn transaction or discount transaction; an incidental credit agreement; an 
instalment agreement; a mortgage agreement or secured loan; a lease; or "any other 
agreement, other than a credit facility or credit guarantee, in terms of which payment 
of an amount owed by one person to another is deferred, and any charge, fee or 
interest is payable to the credit provider in respect of the agreement or the amount 
that has been deferred" (the so-called "catch all credit agreement" as per s 8(4)(f)). 
18 As per s 8(5) an agreement, irrespective of its form, but not including an agreement 
contemplated in s 8(2) as indicated below, constitutes a "credit guarantee" if, in terms 
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expressly provided that a policy of insurance or credit extended by an 
insurer solely to maintain the payment of premiums on a policy of insurance, 
a lease of immovable property or a transaction between a stokvel and a 
member of that stokvel in accordance with the rules of that stokvel, 
irrespective of their form, are not credit agreements for the purposes of the 
NCA.19 
The three types of credit agreements mentioned above fall into further 
categories, namely small,20 intermediate21 and large22 credit agreements, 
generally depending on the amount of credit involved. This distinction 
influences a number of aspects such as certain disclosure requirements and 
exemption from the application of the Act of agreements entered into by 
certain juristic persons. 
The following agreements are expressly exempt from the application of the 
Act:23 
(a) a credit agreement in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person 
whose asset value or annual turnover, together with the combined 
asset value or annual turnover of all related24 juristic persons, at the 
time the agreement is made, equals or exceeds R1 million (hereinafter 
                                            
of that agreement, a person undertakes or promises to satisfy upon demand any 
obligation of another consumer in terms of a credit facility or a credit transaction to 
which the NCA applies. 
19 Section 8(2). 
20 In terms of s 9(2) read with the Determination of Thresholds Regulations (GN 713 in 
GG 28893 of 1 June 2006) (the Thresholds Regulations) a credit agreement is a 
small agreement if it is a pawn transaction; a credit facility with a limit falling at or 
below R15 000 and any other credit transaction, except a mortgage agreement, and 
the principal debt under that transaction or guarantee falls at or below R15 000. 
21 In terms of s 9(3) read with the Thresholds Regulations a credit agreement qualifies 
as an intermediate agreement if it is a credit facility with a credit limit that falls above 
R15 000 or any credit transaction except a pawn transaction or a mortgage 
agreement, and the principal debt under that transaction or guarantee falls between 
R15 000 and R250 000 
22 Per s 9(3) read with the Thresholds Regulations "large credit agreements" are 
mortgage agreements or any other credit transaction except a pawn transaction, if 
the principal debt under that transaction or guarantee falls at or above R250 000. 
Pawn agreements will thus always be small credit agreements and mortgage 
agreements will always be large agreements whilst it should be noted that credit 
facilities can be small or intermediate agreements but are not treated as large 
agreements even though they may fall within the monetary threshold for large 
agreements. 
23 "Exempt" transactions as per s 4(1)(a)-(d) must be distinguished from credit 
agreements to which the Act expressly does not apply as per s 8(2) as set out above. 
24 According to s 4(2)(d), a juristic person is related to another juristic person if one of 
them has direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of the other; 
or a person has direct or indirect control over both of them. 
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referred to as a "large" juristic person); or the State; or an organ of 
State;25 
(b) a large agreement in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person 
whose asset value or annual turnover is, at the time the agreement is 
made, below R1 million26 (hereinafter referred to as a "small" juristic 
person); 
(c) a credit agreement in terms of which the credit provider is the Reserve 
Bank of South Africa;27 or 
(d) a credit agreement in respect of which the credit provider is located 
outside the Republic, approved by the Minister on application by the 
consumer in the prescribed manner and form.28 
Note should also be taken of section 4(2)(c), which provides that the NCA 
applies to a credit guarantee only to the extent that the Act applies to a credit 
facility or credit transaction in respect of which the credit guarantee is 
granted. This effectively means that if the credit transaction or credit facility 
in respect of which the credit guarantee is granted falls outside the 
application of the NCA, the Act will also not apply to the credit guarantee. 
Thus the surety in such an instance will not be able to rely on the provisions 
of the NCA for protection.29  
It is further provided that the application of the NCA extends to a credit 
agreement or proposed credit agreement irrespective of whether the credit 
provider resides or has its principal office within or outside the Republic, or 
(subject to section 4(1)(c)) is an organ of state, an entity controlled by an 
organ of state or an entity created by any public regulation or the Land and 
Agricultural Development Bank.30 Also, if the NCA applies to a credit 
agreement, it continues to apply to that agreement even if a party to that 
                                            
25 Section 4(1)(a). 
26 Section 4(1)(b). It should be noted that the asset value or annual turnover of related 
juristic persons is not taken into account for the purposes of this specific exemption. 
27 Section 4(1)(c). 
28 Section 4(1)(d). See reg 2 of the Thresholds Regulations  for the prescribed manner 
and Form 1 for the prescribed form. 
29 As the subsection provides that the Act applies to a credit guarantee only to the 
extent that the Act applies to the credit facility or credit transaction in respect of which 
the credit guarantee is granted, it is further submitted that a natural person consumer 
who stood surety for a juristic person to whom the Act applies, eg in respect of an 
intermediate credit transaction entered into by a small juristic person, will not be able 
to rely on the provisions of the Act relating to reckless credit and over-indebtedness 
as those provisions do not apply to juristic persons and the surety will be afforded 
the protection of the Act only to the extent that the Act applies to the underlying 
agreement. 
30 Section 4(3)(a) and (b). 
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agreement ceases to reside or have its principal office within the Republic 
and it applies in relation to every transaction, act or omission under that 
agreement, whether that transaction, act or omission occurs within or 
outside the Republic.31 
From the aforementioned it is thus clear that whereas the Act will not apply 
to credit agreements entered into with large juristic persons, as indicated in 
section 4(1)(a)(i) or to large credit agreements, such as for example 
mortgage bonds entered into by small juristic person consumers, the Act in 
fact will apply to small and intermediate credit agreements entered into by 
small juristic person consumers. However, such application to small juristic 
persons is limited by section 6 of the NCA, which indicates that the following 
provisions of the Act do not apply to a credit agreement or proposed credit 
agreement in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person: Chapter 4, 
Parts C and D, which deals with credit marketing practices and over-
indebtedness32 and reckless credit33 respectively; Chapter 5, Part A, section 
89(2)(b), which deals with an agreement resulting from negative option 
marketing; Chapter 5, Part A, section 90(2)(o), which deals with agreements 
at a variable interest rate; and Chapter 5, Part C, which deals with the 
consumer's liability, interest, charges and fees. 
As a result of the aforesaid limited application of the NCA to small juristic 
persons who enter into small and intermediate credit transactions, such 
juristic persons (and by virtue of section 4(2)(b) natural persons who stood 
surety for the credit extended to these juristic persons) enjoy considerably 
fewer benefits under the NCA and will, for instance, not be able to access 
the debt relief provisions of the Act in respect of reckless credit and over-
indebtedness. 
2.3 Responsible lending 
A glaring lacuna in the outdated credit dispensation prior to the NCA was its 
failure to provide effective protection against consumer over-indebtedness 
and to address irresponsible lending practices.34 When the new, more 
comprehensive framework for credit regulation in terms of the NCA was 
drafted it therefore was proposed that it should have a distinct focus on the 
regulation of predatory lending practices that contributed to consumer over-
                                            
31 Section 4(4)(a) and (b). See further s 4(5) for "exemptions" relating to cheques and 
charges against credit facilities. 
32 See s 79. 
33 See s 80. 
34 See in general DTI Consumer Credit Law Reform. Also see Goodwin-Groen and 
Kelly-Louw 2006 http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Rep_NCA 
 AccesstoFinance_2006.pdf; and Renke Evaluation of Debt Prevention Measures. 
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indebtedness.35 One of the hallmarks of the NCA accordingly is the wide 
range of responsible lending measures it introduced in the context of credit 
granting, which either directly or indirectly function as mechanisms to 
prevent consumer over-indebtedness.36 As such the NCA inter alia imposes 
strict obligations regarding the disclosure of information in the form of a pre-
agreement statement and quotation; disclosure requirements relating to 
costs; a statutory in duplum rule that prevents the cost of credit from 
spiralling out of control and locking consumers into debt traps, and 
expressly prohibits "reckless credit" granting.37  
The most pro-active responsible lending measure introduced by the NCA is 
a duty to conduct a pre-agreement assessment prior to entering into a credit 
agreement to establish whether the consumer will be able to afford the said 
credit. This pre-agreement assessment obligation imposed on credit 
providers specifically serves as a "filter" to prevent irresponsible credit 
granting, which is one of the root causes of consumer over-indebtedness.38 
The pre-agreement assessment obligation accordingly operates as basis of 
flagging credit extension as "reckless" in three instances set out in section 
80 of the Act. 
The first type of reckless credit granting for the purposes of the NCA refers 
to the situation where the credit provider extended credit without conducting 
any prior pre-agreement assessment.39 Any credit so extended is per se 
reckless, as the credit provider's failure to conduct a pre-agreement 
assessment before extending credit to the consumer is inexcusable.40 The 
second type of reckless credit granting occurs where, even though the credit 
provider did conduct a pre-agreement assessment, it disregarded the fact 
that the preponderance of available information indicated that the consumer 
was generally ignorant regarding the risks, costs and obligations under a 
credit agreement.41 The third type of reckless credit refers to the situation 
where, despite the fact that a pre-agreement assessment was conducted 
which indicated that the granting of credit under the specific credit 
                                            
35 See Minister of Trade and Industry 2005 http://www.gov.za/sites 
/www.gov.za/files/b18-05_0.pdf. 
36 Section 79 provides that a consumer is over-indebted if "the preponderance of 
available information at the time a determination is made indicates that the particular 
consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under 
all the credit agreements to which the consumer is a party, having regard to the 
consumer's – (a) financial means, prospects and obligations; and (b) probable 
propensity to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party, as indicated by the consumer's history 
of debt repayment". 
37 See Renke Evaluation of Debt Prevention Measures for a detailed discussion. 
38 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 67. 
39 Section 80(1)(a). 
40 The financial position of the consumer is irrelevant to this type of reckless credit. 
41 Section 80(1)(b)(i). 
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agreement would cause the consumer to become over-indebted, the credit 
provider disregarded such information and nevertheless extended the 
specific credit to the consumer, who could clearly not afford it.42 It is 
especially in the context of the third type of reckless credit that the 
significance of a proper pre-agreement affordability assessment is clear. It 
is also important to note that the reckless credit extension as envisaged by 
section 80 must have occurred at the time when the credit was extended43 
– thus a determination of whether credit was granted recklessly, as 
contemplated by the NCA, entails a "set point" determination that is 
conducted with regard to the time of conclusion of the specific credit 
agreement.44 Case law has held that the onus to prove that reckless credit 
was extended in a specific instance rests on the person alleging that the 
specific credit was extended recklessly.45 
As pointed out in the discussion above of the application of the NCA, the 
debt relief provisions in the Act pertaining to reckless credit and over-
indebtedness, as provided for in Part D of Chapter 4, are aimed at natural 
persons only and do not extend to juristic persons.46 Also, where a natural 
person has stood surety for a large juristic person (as per section 4(1)(a)) 
or a small juristic person who entered into a large credit agreement (as per 
section 4(1)(b)), such a natural person will be precluded from relying on the 
Act's provisions relating to reckless credit and over-indebtedness. Reckless 
credit granting can be raised in respect of a wide range of credit 
agreements, secured and unsecured, but not in respect of a school loan or 
a student loan; an emergency loan; a public interest credit agreement; a 
                                            
42 Section 80(1)(b)(ii). It is submitted that it is implied in the context of s 80 that this 
provision should be interpreted broadly also to mean that where the assessment 
shows that the consumer is already over-indebted even before taking up the 
proposed credit, granting him any further credit (that would thus make him even more 
over-indebted) would be reckless. 
43 Authors' emphasis. 
44 Section 80(2) provides that when a determination is to be made whether or not a 
credit agreement is reckless, the person making the determination must apply the 
criteria for reckless credit as contained in s 80(1) as they existed at the time the 
agreement was made and without regard to the ability of the consumer to meet the 
obligations under the agreement or understand or appreciate the risks, costs and 
obligations under the proposed credit agreement at the time that the determination 
is being made. This means that if the consumer since entering a reckless credit 
agreement has become able to afford the credit or educated as to his risks, costs 
and obligations under the agreement, this does not negate the fact that the credit, at 
the time of the conclusion of the agreement was extended recklessly. Thus the 
granting of reckless credit cannot be remedied or ratified ex post the conclusion of 
the agreement. See further Van Heerden and Beyers 2016 JIBLR 446-463. 
45 SA Taxi Securitization (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha 2011 1 SA 310 (GSJ); Absa Bank Ltd v 
Potgieter (ECPE) (unreported) case number 2344/2013 of 31 January 2017. 
46 Gestalt Fund Managers (Pty) Ltd v Secura Systems (Pty) Ltd 2015 JDR 1284 (GJ) 
para 15. 
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pawn transaction; an incidental credit agreement or a temporary increase in 
the credit limit under a credit facility.47 
2.4 Pre-agreement assessment as a measure to prevent reckless 
credit granting 
The pre-agreement assessment duty is set out in section 81(2)(a). It 
prohibits a credit provider from entering into a credit agreement without first 
taking reasonable steps to assess the proposed consumer's: 
(i) general understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the 
proposed credit, and of his rights and obligations under a credit 
agreement; 
(ii) debt repayment history as a consumer under credit agreements; and 
(iii) existing financial means, prospects and obligations.48 In terms of 
section 81(2)(b), if the consumer applies for credit for a commercial 
purpose, the credit provider must assess whether there is a 
reasonable basis to conclude that such a commercial purpose may 
prove to be successful.49 
At this stage it should be pointed out that despite the provision in section 69 
of the NCA that the National Credit Regulator must establish and maintain 
a "national register of credit agreements", to date no such register has been 
established and accordingly credit providers have to consult databases that 
are being kept by credit bureaux in order to obtain information on a 
consumer's credit profile and debt repayment history. All credit bureaux in 
South Africa have to register with the National Credit Regulator in 
accordance with section 43 of the NCA, so at least it can be remarked that 
these credit bureaux are well-regulated and accordingly that the information 
that they keep is generally correct and of a good standard.50 However, it has 
                                            
47 Section 78(2). 
48 Section 78(3) provides that "financial means, prospects and obligations" with respect 
to a consumer or prospective consumer include: "(a) income, or any right to receive 
income, regardless of the source, frequency or regularity of that income, other than 
income that the consumer or prospective consumer receives, has a right to receive, 
or holds in trust for another person; (b) the financial means, prospects and 
obligations of any other adult person within the consumer's immediate family or 
household, to the extent that the consumer, or prospective consumer, and that other 
person customarily - (i) share their respective financial means; and (ii) mutually bear 
their respective financial obligations; and (c) if the consumer has or had a 
commercial purpose for applying for or entering into a particular credit agreement, 
the reasonably estimated future revenue flow from that business purpose". 
49 Section 81(2)(b). See further Desert Star Trading 145 v No 11 Flamboyant Edleen 
CC 2011 2 SA 266 (SCA) paras 14, 15. 
50 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 67. 
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to be pointed out that in South Africa the government from time to time 
declares credit amnesties that result in the removal of certain information 
from credit bureaux which, it is submitted, may compromise the 
completeness of credit bureaux information, its ability to reflect the 
consumer's complete credit history, and how he has conducted himself in 
the past with regard to his use of credit.51 
South African consumers are also obliged to co-operate in the prevention of 
reckless credit granting: section 81(1) provides that when applying for credit, 
and while that application is being considered by a credit provider, the 
prospective consumer must "fully and truthfully" answer any requests for 
information made by the credit provider as part of the pre-agreement 
assessment. It is a complete defence to an allegation of reckless credit if 
the credit provider establishes that the consumer failed to answer fully and 
truthfully any such request for information made by the credit provider and 
if a court or the National Consumer Tribunal52 determines that the 
consumer's failure to do so materially affected the ability of the credit 
provider to make a proper assessment.53 
Although not stated in as many words, a proper reading of the NCA indicates 
that where a credit provider for instance wants to give a consumer an 
increase in a credit facility or wants to advance a further amount to a 
consumer under a mortgage loan secured by a further mortgage bond, the 
credit provider has to conduct a fresh section 81(2) assessment, evaluating 
the consumer's current financial situation as at the time of the extension of 
the extra ("new") credit and thus effectively re-assessing the consumer's 
ability to afford the extra credit.  
The aspect of pre-agreement assessment in terms of the NCA has 
undergone significant reform since its inception: apart from stating that a 
pre-agreement assessment is mandatory and that it has to be conducted by 
means of reasonable steps to assess the three aspects mentioned in 
section 81(2) and imposing a "truthfulness obligation on the consumer", the 
NCA initially did not prescribe any specific assessment model that had to 
be applied by credit providers in order to comply with the pre-assessment 
duty imposed by section 81.54 It was originally provided that a credit provider 
may determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms or models and 
                                            
51 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 67; Kelly-Louw 2015 De Jure 92. 
52 The Tribunal was established in terms of s 26 of the NCA. See s 27 regarding its 
functions and s 83 as well as ss 149-152 regarding the orders it can make. 
53 Section 81(4). For a detailed discussion of this defence see Van Heerden and 
Boraine 2011 De Jure 396-397 and 400; Kelly-Louw 2014 SA Merc LJ 24ff. Also see 
Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 ZAGPJHC 121 (21 September 2011). 
54 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 76. 
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procedures to be used in meeting its assessment obligations under section 
81 as long as they resulted in a fair and objective assessment.55 It was 
further provided that the National Credit Regulator could publish non-
binding guidelines proposing evaluative mechanisms, models and 
procedures for the purposes of pre-agreement assessment.56 No guidelines 
were published until May 2013, however, with the result that credit providers 
to a large extent had a carte blanche in how they structured and conducted 
their section 81 assessments. Due to the lack of guidance in the Act and the 
lack of any guidelines published by the National Credit Regulator, the courts 
had to assist in providing some guidance on when a proper assessment for 
the purposes of section 81 could be said to have been conducted.57 
In Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd58 it was held that, in the light of the wording 
of sections 81(2) and 82(1), whether or not a credit grantor has taken the 
required reasonable steps to meet its assessment obligations is to be 
determined objectively on the facts and circumstances of any given case. In 
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha,59 however, the court remarked 
that  
… while one purpose of the National Credit Act is to discourage reckless 
credit, the Act is also designed to facilitate access to credit by borrowers who 
were previously denied such access. Consequently, an over-critical armchair 
approach by the court towards credit providers when evaluating reckless 
credit, or the imposition of excessive penalties upon lenders who have 
recklessly allowed credit, would significantly chill the availability of credit 
especially to the less affluent members of our society. 
                                            
55 This provision had to be read with s 61(5), which provides that a credit provider may 
determine for itself any scoring or other evaluative mechanism or model to be used 
in managing, underwriting and pricing credit risk, provided that any such mechanism 
or model is not founded or structured upon a statistical or other analysis in which the 
basis of risk categorisation, differentiation or assessment is a ground of unfair 
discrimination prohibited in s 9(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. The original s 82(1) was subject to s 82(2)(a), which provided that the National 
Credit Regulator could pre-approve the evaluative mechanisms, models and 
procedures to be used in terms of s 81 in respect of proposed developmental credit 
agreements. 
56 If a credit provider repeatedly failed to meet its obligations under s 81 or customarily 
used evaluative mechanisms, models or procedures that did not result in a fair and 
objective assessment, the Regulator could in terms of s 82(4)(a) and (b) apply to the 
Tribunal for an order in terms of s 82(4), requiring that credit provider to apply any 
guidelines published by the Regulator in terms of s 82(2)(b) or any alternative 
guidelines consistent with prevalent industry practice. 
57 Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 77. 
58 Horwood v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 ZAGPJHC 121 (21 September 2011). 
59 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha 2011 1 SA 310 (GSJ). 
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In Absa Bank v COE Family Trust60 the credit provider relied on a particular 
clause in a mortgage loan agreement that was worded to constitute an 
acknowledgement that the defendants understood the risks and costs and 
the rights and obligations under the agreement. It was alleged that this 
agreement covered all the requirements for the prescribed assessment and 
further that it was not open to the defendants to raise a defence of reckless 
credit because if it was established in terms of section 81(4) that the 
consumer failed fully and truthfully to answer requests for information made 
by the credit provider, this was a complete "response" (defence) by the 
credit provider to the allegations of reckless credit made by the defendants. 
The court dismissed the matter after considering the clause and stating that 
there was no indication, other than the aforementioned clause, as to 
whether an actual request for information was made to any of the 
defendants by or on behalf of the plaintiff. Such a request would have 
ensured that the credit process was undertaken in terms of the three-
pronged set of inquiries contained in section 81(2). It remarked that because 
it appeared that no assessment as contemplated by section 81(2) had been 
conducted, the issue regarding whether the consumer answered truthfully 
or not as envisaged by section 81(4) became irrelevant. 
The above interventions by the courts assisted in laying down certain broad 
guidelines regarding the section 81 assessment process. However, these 
guidelines were not entirely sufficient as they did not address the specific 
detail of how exactly the pre-agreement assessment had to be conducted 
and specifically how the consumer's affordability had to be assessed. 
Eventually, in November 2012 a joint media statement was issued by the 
Minister of Finance, the National Credit Regulator and the Chairperson of 
the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA), entitled "Ensuring 
Responsible Market Conduct for Bank Lending".61 It was agreed that a 
standard to measure affordability would be formulated which could then be 
incorporated into regulations as minimum standards.62 Subsequently the 
National Credit Regulator issued a public notice in May 201363 in which 
certain broad draft affordability guidelines (not regulations as per the 
aforementioned Joint Statement) were proposed, namely that 
                                            
60 Absa Bank v COE Family Trust 2012 3 SA 184 (WCC). See specifically paras 6-11. 
61 Ministry of Finance 2012 http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/ 
2012/2012110101.pdf (hereafter referred to as the "Joint Statement"). 
62 Joint Statement 3. 
63 See NCR 2013 http://www.ncr.org.za/press_release/Public%20Notice%20.pdf. Also 
see NCR 2010 http://www.ncr.org.za/pdfs/Circulars/Code%20of%20Conduct% 
20for%20CPs.pdf. 
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(a) credit applicants prove their claimed discretionary income when it is 
above the norm for a person with their gross income and that such 
norms be determined as a percentage of gross income bands; 
(b) credit providers consider all the credit applicant's income, expenses 
and debt repayments when doing an affordability assessment; 
(c) credit providers refrain from lending to the maximum of the consumer's 
discretionary income and leave a margin of at least 25 percent of their 
discretionary income for adverse changes in the economy or the 
consumer's circumstances (thus an "adversity buffer"); 
(d) credit providers use the credit applicant's current information as stored 
with one or more credit bureaux; 
(e) credit providers process applications for credit within seven days from 
assessing an applicant's credit information as stored with credit 
bureaux; and 
(f) credit providers share credit application information with credit 
bureaux to allow for better affordability assessments to be made by 
other credit providers and to reduce credit application fraud. 
The May 2013 Draft Guidelines thus set out the broad approach that would 
underlie the eventual creation of a binding set of affordability regulations. 
More refined and comprehensive guidelines (not regulations) were 
published in September 2013.64 An important intervention subsequent to 
the September 2013 guidelines entailed the approval of the National Credit 
Amendment Act65 which, although approved, had not yet been put into 
operation pending the introduction inter alia of affordability assessment 
regulations (not merely guidelines). Section 48 of the NCA was amended to 
provide for the Minister of Trade and Industry, on the recommendation of 
the National Credit Regulator,66 to prescribe criteria and measures to 
determine the outcome (sic) of affordability assessments.67 Sections 82(1) 
and (2) of the NCA were replaced to provide that a credit provider may 
determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms or models and procedures 
                                            
64 September 2013 Affordability Assessment Guidelines available at 
http://debtfreedigi.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/NCR-AffordabilityAssessment 
Guidelines.pdf. For a detailed discussion see Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 79-
82. 
65 National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. 
66 Section 24 of the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. 
67 Section 15(c) of the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. Obviously the 
Minister cannot determine the outcome of these assessments but merely how the 
assessments must be conducted. 
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to be used in meeting its assessment obligations under section 81, provided 
that any such mechanism, model or procedure results in a fair and objective 
assessment which must not be inconsistent with the affordability 
assessment regulations68 made by the Minister of Trade and Industry.69 As 
a result of the amendments introduced by the National Credit Amendment 
Act, the final Affordability Assessment regulations that came into operation 
in September 2015 as discussed below are now binding subordinate 
legislation that constitutes the minimum standards which credit providers 
have to comply with in conducting the pre-agreement assessment 
envisaged by section 81.70 
After the publication of the approved National Credit Amendment Act but 
prior to its being put into operation, a comprehensive set of draft regulations 
on various matters including regulations on affordability assessment was 
published in August 2014 for public comment.71 On 13 March 2015 the 
National Credit Amendment Act was eventually put into operation together 
with the final "National Credit Regulations including Affordability 
Assessment Regulations".72 The coming into operation of the Final 
Affordability Assessment Regulations was, however, postponed for a further 
six months until 13 September 2015 to afford credit providers the 
opportunity to align their assessment models with the Affordability 
Regulations.73 
In line with section 78(1), the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations 
apply only when credit agreements governed by the NCA are entered into 
by natural person consumers. Certain credit agreements are exempt from 
the application of the regulations74 but no distinction is made between 
                                            
68 Authors' emphasis. 
69 Section 24 of the National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014. Also see s 15(b), which 
amends s 48 of the NCA to the effect that with regard to the registration of credit 
providers the compliance by a credit provider with the affordability assessment 
regulations made by the Minister on the recommendation of the National Credit 
Regulator may inter alia be considered. 
70 Where allegations of reckless credit are made based on a s 81 assessment which 
was conducted prior to 13 September 2015 (being the date that the final Affordability 
Assessment regulations took effect) the original considerations where no binding 
guidelines for the assessment existed will apply. 
71 GN R597 in GG 37882 of 1 August 2014. 
72 National Credit Regulations including Affordability Assessment Regulations 
published in GN R202 in GG 38557 of 13 March 2015. 
73 GN 756 in GG 39127 of 21 August 2015 (the Final Affordability Assessment 
Regulations). 
74 See reg 23A(2) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. These exempt 
agreements include a developmental credit agreement; a school loan or a student 
loan; a public interest credit agreement; a pawn transaction; an incidental credit 
agreement; an emergency loan; a temporary increase under a credit facility; a 
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secured and unsecured credit agreements.75 In terms of the Regulations a 
credit provider is obliged to take practicable76 steps to assess the consumer 
or joint consumers'77 discretionary income to determine whether the 
consumer has the financial means and prospects to pay the proposed credit 
agreements.78 The credit provider must validate the consumer's gross 
income. The Regulations specify the specific documentation to be obtained 
for such verification with regard to consumers who receive a salary from an 
employer, those who do not, and consumers who are self-employed.79 
Regulation 23A(8) requires the credit provider to make a calculation of the 
consumer's existing financial means, prospects and obligations. When 
calculating the consumer's existing financial obligations the Regulations 
compel the credit provider to utilise a table of certain minimum expense 
norms (Table 1) contained in the regulations (which table is broken down by 
monthly gross income for certain specified income bands), namely: 
                                            
unilateral credit limit increase in a credit facility in terms of ss 119(1)(c), 119(4) and 
119(5) of the Act; a pre-existing credit agreement in terms of Schedule 3 Item 4(2) 
of the Act; any change to a credit agreement and/or any deferral or waiver of an 
amount under an existing credit agreement in accordance with s 95 of the Act and 
mortgage credit agreements that qualify for the Finance Linked Subsidy 
Programmes developed by the Department of Human Settlements and credit 
advanced for housing that falls within the thresholds set from time to time. The 
exemptions in the Regulations basically mirror the exempt agreements mentioned in 
s 78(2) but also add specific instances of low-cost mortgage credit as 
aforementioned. 
75 The September 2013 guidelines distinguished between secured and unsecured 
credit. See Van Heerden and Renke 2015 IIR 80. 
76 There appears to be a discrepancy between the NCA and the regulations in this 
regard as s 81(2) of the NCA requires the credit provider to take "reasonable" steps 
to assess the aspects mentioned in s 81(2). 
77 "Joint consumers" are defined in the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations as 
"consumers that are co-principal debtors who are jointly and severally liable with 
regard to the same credit agreement and apply jointly for the credit agreement 
excluding the surety or a credit guarantor under a credit guarantee". 
78 Regulation 23A(3) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. 
79 Regulation 23A(4) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. Where the 
consumer's monthly gross income shows material variance, reg 23A(5) provides that 
the average gross income over the period of not less than three pay periods 
preceding the credit application must be used. 
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Table 1: NCR minimum expense norms 
Income 
Band 
Minimum 
income 
Maximum 
income 
Minimum 
monthly 
fixed factor 
Monthly fixed 
factor: percentage 
of amount above 
band minimum 
1 R0.00 R800.00 R0.00 100% 
2 R800.01 R6 250.00 R800.00 6.75% 
3 R6 250.01 R25 000.00 R1 167.88 9.00% 
4 R25 000.01 R50 000.00 R2 855.28 8.20% 
5 R50 000.01 Unlimited R4 905.38 6.75% 
 
According to Regulation 23A(10) the following methodology must be applied 
when using the Table: The credit provider must ascertain the consumer's 
gross income; thereafter statutory deductions and minimum living expenses 
must be deducted to arrive at a net income, which must be allocated for the 
payment of debt instalments. When existing instalments are taken into 
account, the credit provider must calculate the consumer's discretionary 
income that will be available to enable the consumer to satisfy any new debt. 
It is to be noted that the credit provider may on an exceptional basis, where 
justified, accept the consumer's declared minimum expenses which are 
lower than those set out in Table 1, provided that the credit provider sees to 
it that a questionnaire, which is set out in Schedule 1 to the Regulations, is 
completed by the consumer or joint consumers to serve as proof that the 
specific consumer's living expenses are lower than prescribed by Table 1.80 
However, as discussed in more detail below, the practical application of 
Table 1, as it currently appears in the Final Affordability Regulations, is 
problematic. 
Regulation 23A(10) has to be read with Regulation 23A(12), which obliges 
the credit provider, when conducting an affordability assessment, to 
calculate the consumer's discretionary income; to take into account all 
monthly debt repayment obligations in terms of credit agreements as 
reflected on the consumer's credit profile held by a registered credit bureau; 
                                            
80 Regulation 23A(11) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. The words 
"the questionnaire set out in the Schedule, as issued from time to time" appear to 
imply that the questionnaire may be amended from time to time. 
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and to take into account maintenance payments and other necessary 
expenses. 
In line with section 81(2) the mandatory consultation of credit bureaux 
records prior to extending credit to a consumer is a prominent feature of the 
pre-agreement assessment process – hence the emphasis put on this 
requirement by the Regulations that further oblige the credit provider to take 
into account the consumer's debt repayment history (not merely how many 
transactions are listed in his name) as a consumer under credit agreements 
as contemplated in section 81(2)(a).81 The credit provider must ensure that 
this requirement is performed within seven business days immediately prior 
to the initial approval of credit or the increasing of a credit limit, and within 
fourteen business days in the case of mortgages.82 Obviously, the credit 
provider will also have to submit proof that he complied with this 
requirement. However, it can be observed at this stage that it does not make 
sense why there should be a distinction between mortgage credit and other 
credit in so far as the consultation period of credit bureaux is concerned. If 
the purpose of the credit bureau check is to ascertain the extent of the 
consumer's existing debt obligations it would make more sense to conduct 
such a credit bureau consultation as close to the conclusion of the proposed 
credit agreement as possible, to minimise the risk that the consumer in the 
meantime enters into other credit that may compromise his repayment 
ability. 
In South Africa it often happens that consumers take up so-called 
"consolidation loans" in terms of which they borrow an amount of money 
that is large enough to settle their smaller credit agreements so that they 
then effectively rid themselves of those smaller credit agreements and 
various credit providers. Accordingly the Regulations provide that in order 
to avoid "double counting" in calculating the consumer's discretionary 
income where a credit agreement is entered into on a substitutionary basis 
in order to settle one or more existing credit agreements, a credit provider 
must record that the credit being applied for is to replace other existing credit 
agreements.83 In practical terms this means that the credit provider's 
affordability calculation must not deduct the instalments for those small 
agreements from the consumer's nett income as those amounts will be 
included in the monthly instalment of the new proposed consolidation loan. 
In addition the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations, echoing the 
                                            
81 This makes sense as such a history will reveal the consumer's exposure in terms of 
existing credit obligations, which plays a pivotal role in determining affordability. 
82 Regulation 23A(13)(a) and (b) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. 
83 Regulation 23A(14)(a) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. In addition, 
reg 23A(14)(B) states that the credit provider must take practicable steps to ensure 
that such credit is properly used for such purposes. 
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provisions of the NCA that already exist in this regard, again mandate the 
disclosure of the credit cost multiple and the total cost of credit to the 
consumer.84 
As indicated above, responsible lending also requires the co-operation of 
the consumer. The Regulations therefore also impose certain obligations on 
the consumer: he or she must accurately disclose to the credit provider all 
his or her financial obligations to enable the credit provider to conduct the 
affordability assessment and must for that purpose also provide authentic 
documentation to the credit provider.85 
At this stage the South African courts have not yet had the opportunity to 
engage extensively with the augmented pre-agreement assessment 
process as mandated by section 81(2) read with the Final Affordability 
Regulations, as these affordability regulations have come into effect only 
recently and their application is still in a "honeymoon phase". However, it is 
clear that the pre-agreement process in South Africa has to be conducted 
within the parameters of the legal framework as indicated above. Even 
though the NCA still provides that credit providers may use their own 
evaluative methods, they do not have much discretion on how to do the 
assessment because of the strict obligations imposed by the Final 
Affordability Assessment Regulations. It is also not improbable that the 
Regulations themselves may be challenged in court due to certain 
problematic aspects. It is important to point out here that the mandatory 
utilisation of Table 1 was first introduced in the September 2013 guidelines 
where annual income was used as basis for the selection of income bands 
contained in the Table. In the said guidelines an example was provided as 
to the practical application of the Table, which indicated that, as a general 
guideline, should the prospective consumer have an annual gross income 
of R24 000 the credit provider may not accept annual necessary expenses 
of less than R14 400 (being the amount indicated as annual minimum living 
expenses for that income band) plus R648 (being 6.75% of R9 600). The 
annual income bands and annual living expenses mentioned in this first 
version of Table 1 were subsequently revised and the Table 1 version 
contained in the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations contains 
                                            
84 In terms of reg 23A(15) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations a credit 
provider must disclose to the consumer the credit cost multiple and the total cost of 
credit in the pre-agreement statement and quotation; ensure that the credit cost 
multiple disclosures for credit facilities is based on one year of full utilisation up to 
the credit limit proposed; ensure that the attention of the prospective consumer is 
drawn to the credit cost multiple and that the cost of credit as disclosed is understood 
by the prospective consumer; disclose a total cost of credit which includes but is not 
limited to the following items: the principal debt; interest, initiation fee (if any); service 
fee aggregated to the life of a loan; and credit insurance aggregated to the life of a 
loan as set out in s 106 of the Act. 
85 Regulation 23A(6) and (7) of the Final Affordability Assessment Regulations. 
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income bands based on monthly income and refers to monthly living 
expenses. However, this practical explanation of how to apply Table 1 is 
absent from the final 2015 regulations, thus making it basically impossible 
for a credit provider to apply the Table without having access to the 
September 2013 guidelines. Even then it is uncertain whether the legislature 
intended that specific "formula" to apply to the use of the current Table 1 as 
it is not mentioned in the final regulations at all. Nowhere in the final 
regulations is an explanation provided of the purpose of the monthly fixed 
factor in the Table and exactly how the amounts in the Table should be 
calculated to assess the affordability of a consumer. This may create a lot 
of confusion and uncertainty especially for smaller, less-resourced credit 
providers. Other points of criticism are inter alia that the income bands and 
designated living expenses in Table 1 do not take into account that the 
profiles for consumers within a specific income may differ substantially and 
that this may significantly influence their living expenses; and also that the 
Table does not incorporate any "adversity buffer", as was indicated in the 
May 2013 guidelines.86 However, it should be pointed out that, with respect 
to the minimum living expenses as prescribed by Table 1, this does not 
mean that the credit provider does not have to ask the consumer to furnish 
information about his living expenses – the idea is that the consumer should 
be requested to provide details of his actual living expenses and the credit 
provider should take that actual amount into account – the Table only caps 
those living expenses at a minimum, meaning that the amount set out in 
Table 1 is the smallest amount that may be used for the affordability 
calculation unless the consumer completes the prescribed questionnaire to 
justify the lower expenses. However, in practice the problem may arise that 
credit providers are under the incorrect impression that they can use the 
Table alone, and do not need to assess the consumer's actual living 
expenses. 
2.5  Discussion and concluding remarks 
Certain pertinent aspects of pre-agreement assessment in South Africa and 
the context in which it is to be undertaken warrant further discussion, 
namely: 
2.5.1 Obligation to obtain information from the consumer in order to assess 
the consumer's creditworthiness 
The NCA does not expressly provide that the credit provider has to obtain 
information from the consumer to assess his creditworthiness and it does 
not provide a standard list of information to be obtained. However, it is clear 
from section 81(2) that the credit provider has to obtain information 
                                            
86 Van Heerden and Beyers 2016 JIBLR 446-463. 
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regarding the consumer's financial means, prospects and obligations. When 
one has regard to the definition of "financial means, prospects and 
obligations" in the Act it is evident that the credit provider will have to obtain 
information regarding the consumer's income, the regularity of such income, 
and also that of a person who customarily contributes to the income and 
shares the consumer's obligations, such as a spouse. The Final Affordability 
Regulations also provide an indication of the type of information that the 
credit provider has to assess, namely the consumer's gross income, the 
statutory deductions made from the income, his living expenses and his 
other debt obligations. Nowhere is it stated that the credit provider has to 
assess the consumer's assets and their value, because clearly the idea is 
that the consumer should be able to afford the credit without having to sell 
assets and that the consumer's assets are relevant solely for the purposes 
of collateral. Given that a consumer is usually privy to the information 
relating to his financial position and outlook, this means in practical terms 
that the credit provider will usually ask the consumer to provide information 
regarding his financial means, prospects and obligations during the credit 
application process. Section 81(4) read with Regulation 23A(6) and (7) 
makes it clear that the consumer has to provide complete, accurate and 
truthful information when requested to do so by the credit provider and must 
also provide authentic documentation in this regard. The Final Affordability 
Regulations oblige the credit provider to make a thorough assessment, as 
the Regulations not only prescribe the methodology for the assessment but 
also, in line with section 81(2), require the credit provider to have regard to 
credit bureaux information pertaining to the consumer's existing debt 
obligations. Although the Regulations require the credit provider to verify the 
consumer's gross income only, it is submitted that the consumer's salary 
slips will usually also reflect the relevant statutory deductions and 
accordingly the credit provider will also be able to verify those statutory 
deductions. 
In so far as the verification of living expenses is concerned, it may be 
possible to argue that the fact that minimum living expenses are prescribed 
to be taken into account obviates the need for the verification of the 
consumer's living expenses. However, the fact that the living expenses are 
capped at a minimum does not mean that a credit provider is entitled to 
ignore a consumer's actual living expenses if he provides detail of living 
expenses that are greater than the prescribed minimum. In general, given 
that living expenses are very difficult to verify and may fluctuate, one can 
understand that apart from requiring that the credit provider at least make 
sure that the consumer's expenses are not less than the prescribed amount 
for his income band, the legislature does not require the credit provider to 
verify the consumer's living expenses. However, in order to avoid that 
consumers lie about their living expenses by indicating that they are lower 
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than the prescribed amounts in order to obtain credit that they cannot afford 
or that unscrupulous credit providers manipulate the consumer's living 
expenses and take into account amounts less than the prescribed amounts 
for the consumer's income band, there is the safety net of the prescribed 
questionnaire that must be completed. The questionnaire reminds the 
consumer that he must provide the information fully (thus completely) and 
truthfully in order to facilitate a correct assessment. Furthermore it makes 
provision for the consumer's income band to be indicated on the form as 
well as the prescribed minimum living expense for his income band (as per 
Table 1) and also the lower, total amount of his living expenses as alleged 
by him so that it is easy to see the difference in the prescribed minimum 
amount and the alleged lower amount of his living expenses. Notable about 
this prescribed questionnaire is that it is actually a good indicator of the type 
of information required to be obtained in respect of the consumer's living 
expenses as it makes provision for accommodation, transport, food, 
education, medical expenses, water and electricity and maintenance.87 The 
obligation on a credit provider to consult credit bureaux not only enables the 
credit provider to ascertain the consumer's payment history and whether the 
consumer has used credit responsibly in the past or whether he has an 
inclination to default, but it also serves to verify the extent of the consumer's 
debt obligations. The closer to the conclusion of the agreement such a credit 
bureau check is done, the smaller the risk that the credit provider may have 
taken up other credit that is not reflected on the credit bureau records. 
2.5.2 Prohibition against providing credit 
In practical terms, with reference to section 80 of the Act, the prohibition in 
the NCA against reckless credit granting means that a credit provider is 
prohibited from granting credit to a consumer if the credit provider has not 
conducted a pre-agreement assessment to determine whether the 
consumer understands the implications of the credit that he wishes to take 
up and whether the consumer can actually afford the credit. However, the 
legislature has realised that merely requiring a pre-agreement assessment 
to be conducted before granting credit will not necessarily curb the 
possibility that the credit may propel the consumer into over-indebtedness 
or, where he is already over-indebted by the time that he applies for such 
credit, that it will not make him even more over-indebted. Therefore the 
result of a pre-agreement assessment will also bar a credit provider from 
granting credit to a specific consumer if, on a preponderance of 
probabilities, it appears from the assessment that the consumer lacked a 
general understanding of the risks and costs of the proposed credit and of 
                                            
87 It is not clear exactly what the item "maintenance" in the questionnaire refers to; for 
example, whether it refers to maintenance payments in respect of minor children or 
whether it refers to items not listed above, such as clothing. 
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the rights and obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement or caused 
him to become over-indebted (or more over-indebted). 
2.5.3 Obligation to provide information and an adequate explanation 
Given South Africa's diverse population and the high incidence of illiteracy, 
the NCA places priority on the right of consumers to be provided with 
information in plain and understandable language.88 Part B of Chapter 5 of 
the Act deals specifically with the disclosure requirements and section 92 
specifies certain mandatory pre-agreement disclosures that must be made 
by the credit provider before entering into a credit agreement with a 
consumer. For small credit agreements these disclosures entail a pre-
agreement statement in a prescribed (standardised) form as well as a 
quotation in a prescribed (standardised) form.89 For large and intermediate 
agreements the credit provider must also provide the consumer with a pre-
agreement statement (here there is no prescribed form but all the 
information to be specified is indicated in regulation 31) as well as a 
quotation in the prescribed form.90 In essence the pre-agreement statement 
indicates how the proposed credit agreement will look, but is personalised 
to reflect the specific credit that the consumer wishes to take up with all its 
terms and conditions and so forth, whereas the quotation sets out in detail 
the cost of the proposed credit.91 The credit quotation provided to the 
consumer is binding upon the credit provider for five business days, 
meaning that the consumer is free to "shop around" and compare other 
similar credit offerings from credit providers to see if he can get a better deal 
elsewhere, but if he returns within 5 business days to the credit provider 
who provided him with the quotation, that credit provider will be bound to 
the interest rate and other cost of credit quoted in the aforesaid quotation. 
Although one can expect that in practice a credit provider will, generally 
upon being requested by a consumer, but sometimes also on his own 
initiative, explain the features of the proposed credit to the consumer, the 
NCA does not expressly oblige the credit provider to render such an 
explanation. 
                                            
88 Section 64. Also see Stoop 2011 IJPL 329; Barnard 2014 J Cons & Comm L 1, where 
she discusses the plain language requirement in s 22 of the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008, which is similar to the plain language provision in s 64 of the NCA. 
89 Section 92(1) read with reg 28 (pre-agreement statement and quotation for small 
agreements), reg 30 (prescribed form for small agreements) and forms 20 
(quotation) and 20.2 (prescribed form for small agreements). 
90 Section 92(2) read with reg 29 (pre-agreement statement and quotation for 
intermediate or large agreements), reg 31 (requirements for intermediate or large 
agreements) and Form 20.1 (quotation). 
91 See further s 101 regarding the cost of credit and reg 42 regarding minimum 
prescribed interest and initiation fees as well as reg 44 regarding service fees. 
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2.5.4 Obligation to provide advice on the suitability of credit 
The NCA places no express obligation on the credit provider to advise the 
consumer on the suitability of the proposed credit for his specific needs. 
Thus when a credit provider has furnished the consumer with the mandatory 
disclosure documents, namely the pre-agreement statement and quotation 
and, where requested to do so, has provided the consumer with an 
explanation regarding the features of the proposed credit, it is up to the 
consumer to decide whether the credit suits his needs and whether he wants 
to enter into the credit agreement. This choice of the consumer is of course 
subject to the pre-agreement assessment's having a favourable outcome. 
2.5.5 Reflection and withdrawal 
As indicated above, a consumer is given a withdrawal period of 5 business 
days before he enters into a credit agreement, during which the credit 
provider is bound to the quotation he provided in respect of the proposed 
credit. During this time the consumer can "reflect" on the credit by 
comparing the specific credit offer with other similar offers in order to 
eventually make an informed decision as to whether or not to take up the 
proposed credit. Section 121 of the NCA further provides the consumer with 
a cooling-off right that he can exercise in order to exit a credit agreement 
without breach thereof within 5 business days after the conclusion of a lease 
or instalment agreement that was entered into at any location other than the 
business premises of the credit provider.92 
2.5.6 Sanctions and remedies 
Reckless credit granting constitutes "prohibited conduct" in terms of the 
NCA and attracts an administrative fine by the National Consumer 
Tribunal.93 A credit provider may also be at risk of having its registration 
cancelled if it engages in reckless credit granting.94 Civil remedies available 
to consumers to address the consequences of reckless credit granting are 
contained in sections 83 and 84 of the Act and in brief entail that the credit 
agreement can either be set aside completely or partially coupled with a 
"suspension". Such a suspension in essence entails that the credit 
                                            
92 In terms of s 121 a consumer may terminate a credit agreement within five business 
days after the date on which the agreement was signed by the consumer, by 
delivering a notice in the prescribed manner to the credit provider and tendering the 
return of any money or goods or paying in full for any services received by the 
consumer in respect of the agreement. For a detailed discussion see Otto 
"Conclusion, Alteration and Termination of Credit Agreements" para 9.5.2. 
93 Section 151. Such an administrative fine may not exceed the greater of 10 per cent 
of the credit provider's annual turnover during the preceding financial year or R1 
million. 
94 Section 48. 
CM VAN HEERDEN & R STEENNOT PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  26 
provider's right to enforce the reckless agreement is suspended and that he 
forfeits interest and other charges under the agreement for a specified time 
period, or where the agreement led to the consumer's over-indebtedness 
the remedy can be a suspension of the credit provider's rights under that 
credit agreement coupled with a restructuring of the consumer's other credit 
agreement debt.95 Whereas the administrative penalties and cancellation of 
licences serve to deter and punish reckless credit granting, the civil 
remedies not only deter reckless lending but also serve to incentivise 
responsible lending, whilst also remedying the ill effects of reckless credit 
granting.96  
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